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INTRODUCTION
Historically, illegitimate children were punished because their parents
were unmarried. The children of opposite-sex cohabiting couples are
disadvantaged in similar ways today,1 and, to a lesser extent, so are
stepchildren. In another article, I have discussed the impact that the current
state of family law, with respect to custody, visitation, and child support,
has on impact upon these children.2 Significant problems with respect to
∗
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to Lilian Balasanian and Roberto Cruz for their able research assistance and Amy
Emerson in the Cornell Law Library for her continuing help on this project. I would
also like to thank Nancy Polikoff for her suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article
and participants at the conference on “The New Illegitimacy” held at American
University Washington College of Law on March 25-26, 2011 for their helpful
comments.
1. I limit my attention here to the children of opposite-sex cohabiting couples. I
have great respect for the work done by other feminist scholars concerning the
problems of children of gay and lesbian couples. While they have been covering this
ground, little attention has been paid to the children of opposite-sex cohabiting couples.
Moreover, some of the problems confronted by the two groups are not identical and
deserve separate attention. For example, the developing jurisprudence about children
of lesbian couples has primarily concerned children they have intentionally and jointly
brought into being and have parented together since birth. Children living with
cohabiting parents who are the biological children of only one partner, by contrast, tend
to be older when the stepparent-like relationship is formed.
2. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Legal Relationship Between Cohabitants and
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each of these issues afflict stepchildren and children who live with a
cohabiting couple, especially those who are the biological children of only
one partner. In this Article, I direct my attention to the effect upon these
children of current American law regarding inheritance, government
benefits, and standing to bring a number of tort claims.
As of the 2010 census, about 4,560,000 children lived in households
headed by opposite-sex cohabiting couples, almost six percent of all
children in the United States.3 About fifty-five percent of these children
are the biological offspring of both cohabitants, and about forty-five
percent are children of only one of the cohabitants—typically seventy-eight
percent of the woman.4 The overall statistics differ dramatically by race
and ethnic group.5 These families are also disproportionately found among
lower-income households.6 Tellingly, many of the cases challenging laws
classifying children on the basis of illegitimacy, including both Levy v.
Louisiana7 and Labine v. Vincent,8 were brought by African American
plaintiffs.9
The situation of biological children of only one of two cohabitants is
functionally identical to that of stepchildren, except that the unmarried
stepparent is not legally obligated to support the child’s parent. Many
scholars believe that the distinction between stepchildren whose parents are
married and those whose parents are unmarried makes little real difference
and should be disregarded.10 Social scientific studies of stepchildren and
cohabitants’ children support this conclusion. Married or unmarried,

Their Partners’ Children, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 127 (2012).
3. Statistics extrapolated from America’s Families and Living Arrangements:
2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbl.C3, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/
hh-fam/cps2010.html (last visited August 26, 2011).
4. Id.
5. Id.; see, e.g., Wendy D. Manning & Daniel T. Lichter, Parental Cohabitation
and Children’s Economic Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 998, 1002-03 (1996)
(reporting that eight percent of Puerto Rican children, five percent of Mexican
American and Black children, and three percent of non-Hispanic white children live in
cohabiting families).
6. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 106-17 (2010); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal
Policy: The Case of Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 10-15 (2007).
7. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
8. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
9. See Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 94-96 (2003).
10. For example, at the conference at which I presented my previous paper in
December 2010 in Tel Aviv, both Israeli and American participants believed that the
two groups of children—those living with married stepparents and those living with
cohabiting stepparents—should be treated the same. Indeed, one Israeli scholar,
Daphna Hacker, remarked that she wrote a similar paper and it never even occurred to
her to distinguish between the two.
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stepparents are a varied group—male and female, having their own
children from previous unions or not, more and less close to their
stepchildren.11 The quality of a stepparent-stepchild relationship varies
with the age of the child at the time of the remarriage or beginning of
cohabitation and the length of time the two have lived together.12 Some
stepparents become very involved in the lives of their stepchildren,
virtually replacing the noncustodial biological parent,13 while others remain
distanced from their partner’s child; the second scenario is especially
common if the child was an adolescent when the stepparent moved in.14
The relationships between children and stepparents differ in a variety of
ways from the relationships children have with biological parents with
whom they have lived since birth, but studies have shown that stepchildren
share these differences with children of cohabitants.15
In my previous article, I focused on potential and probable harms
experienced by some of these children if their biological parent dies or
separates from the other cohabitant or stepparent. If the biological parent
dies, current law would typically remove their partner’s children from the
household in which they have been living, and place them in the custody of
their noncustodial parent or other relatives. This potentially separates the
children from their primary caretaker, from the home and neighborhood
with which they are familiar, and from step- or half-siblings they have
regarded as family, 16 with no presumptive right to visitation. A similar
result is likely to occur if the adults separate, with particularly harmful
consequences if the non-biological parent has been the child’s primary
caretaker.17 Moreover, if the child’s parent and his or her married or
11. See David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law’s
Perceptions of “Family” after Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 10308 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
12. See, e.g., Constance R. Ahrons, Family Ties After Divorce: Long-Term
Implications for Children, 46 FAM. PROCESS 53, 61 (2006); Chambers, supra note 11,
at 104-06; Maria Schmeeckle et al., What Makes Someone Family? Adult Children’s
Perceptions of Current and Former Stepparents, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 595, 597-98
(2006).
13. See Eric G. Andersen, Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests
and Legal Standards, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 935, 963 (1998); see also LAWRENCE H.
GANONG & MARILYN COLEMAN, STEPFAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DEVELOPMENT,
DYNAMICS, AND INTERVENTIONS 128-30 (2004).
14. Chambers, supra note 11, at 106; Susan L. Pollet, Still A Patchwork Quilt: A
Nationwide Survey of State Law Regarding Stepparent Rights and Obligations, 48
FAM. CT. REV. 528, 530 (2010).
15. Susan L. Brown, Family Structure and Child Well-Being: The Significance of
Parental Cohabitation, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 351, 364 (2004) (reporting that child
outcomes are similar whether a parent remarries or forms a cohabiting stepfamily).
16. Sarah E.C. Malia, Balancing Family Members’ Interests Regarding Stepparent
Rights and Obligations: A Social Policy Challenge, 54 FAM. REL. 298, 304 (2005).
17. See, e.g., In re Bruce, 522 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a common
law veto power by custodial parents over visitation between child and all third parties
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cohabiting stepparent separate, sudden economic disaster may befall the
child, who has no right to child support from the ex-cohabitant, even if both
child and parent have depended upon the cohabitant’s income.18 Social
scientific studies show that this is likely to be the case, especially for
children living with a married or unmarried stepfather. Women and
children gain a virtually identical income premium from either cohabitation
or marriage—a gain of roughly fifty-five percent in needs-adjusted total
family income.19 If the relationship ends, women cohabitants lose about
one third of their household income, leaving them with levels of household
income similar to that of divorced women.20 The impact is particularly
severe upon African American and Hispanic women and their children, and
may stand between them and poverty.21 In short, the economic support
children receive from their parent’s partner is very important to their
welfare.
In this Article, I argue that a number of legal benefits—inheritance upon
death of a parent or stepparent, government benefits available upon the
death or disability of the family’s wage earner, and a variety of tort claims
that compensate for support lost as a result of a tortiously-caused death—
are the functional equivalents of support and should be available to children
even if their parents chose not to marry.
except for the other biological parent prevented the court from granting visitation to the
man who had served in the role of child’s father and supported her for several years); In
re Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Iowa 1993) (holding that there was no basis under
common law or statute to grant visitation to a man who had lived with a child for one
year and exercised visitation with her for four years after cohabitation ended); In re
Marriage of Freel, 448 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1989) (denying visitation to cohabiting
stepmother who had served as young child’s primary parent for five years, thus ending
child’s relationship to two half-sisters as well).
18. Children receive continued support from married stepparents only in
exceptional cases. See, e.g., Laurence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of
Support: Beyond the Biological Tie—But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1, 4 (2000); Sarah H. Ramsey & Judith M. Masson, Stepparent Support
of Stepchildren: A Comparative Analysis of Policies and Problems in the American and
English Experience, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 666-74 (1985) (detailing when those
exceptions apply); Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the
Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 43-44 (1984).
19. See Audrey Light, Gender Differences in the Marriage and Cohabitation
Income Premium, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 263, 263 (2004); Donna Ruane Morrison & Amy
Ritualo, Routes to Children’s Economic Recovery after Divorce: Are Cohabitation and
Remarriage Equivalent?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 560, 570 (2000) (noting that one study
reports that children of divorced parents experience an increase of about $6,000 in their
median adjusted family income if their custodial parent either remarries or cohabits).
20. Sarah Avellar & Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Consequences of the
Dissolution of Cohabiting Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 315, 324 (2005).
21. Id. In 2000, for example, 39.7 percent of children living with cohabiting
couples were reported to be living in poverty, but this fell to 20.1 percent if the
cohabiting partner’s income was taken into account. Daniel T. Lichter et al,, Child
Poverty Among Racial Minorities and Immigrants: Explaining Trends and
Differentials, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 1037, 1046 (2005).
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I. INHERITANCE
If a person does not make a will, his or her heirs are dictated by the
state’s intestacy statute. These laws provide, almost without exception, that
the dead person’s estate shall go to any surviving spouse and children but
do not mention cohabitants or their stepchildren.22 Even if a person does
make a will and that will makes inadequate provision for his or her spouse,
the spouse can claim an elective share prescribed by statute against the will.
But the United States is one of very few countries in which a person may
disinherit his or her own children, so they do not receive protection similar
to that given a spouse.23 Stepchildren are mentioned in the intestacy
statutes of a few states, but they stand to inherit only if there are no other
heirs left to do so, including collateral heirs from the person’s family of
origin, and thus the property would escheat to the state.24
Of course, a cohabitant may make a will in favor of his or her children or
partner’s children, but most people fail to make wills. People do not make
wills for a variety of reasons—their youth, reluctance to think about death,
dislike of lawyers, or the expense, for example.25 The disposition to make
a will has been shown to vary with wealth, age, and occupation, with more
educated, wealthier, and older persons more likely to do so. Sixty-five
percent of those whose family income is below $75,000 did not have wills
in one survey; 65.4 percent of those under the age of forty-six had no will,
and 67.8 percent had no will even though they had minor children.26 As
one would expect, based on the distribution of groups who cohabit, who
tend to be younger and of lower income than other couples,27 cohabitants
are especially likely to die intestate.28 Because so few people make wills—
22. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 2-7 to 2-9 (4th ed. 2006).
23. RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 90-91
(2004).
24. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Evolving Rights and Duties of Step-parents: Making
New Rules for New Families, in PARENTHOOD IN MODERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND
SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 375, 382 (John Eekelaar & Petar
Sarcevic eds., 1993); Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate
Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 920-21 (1989); Kim A. Feigenbaum,
Note, The Changing Family Structure: Challenging Stepchildren’s Lack of Inheritance
Rights, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 167, 169 (2000).
25. See BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 70.
26. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
319, 336-38 (1978); WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 22, at 2-1 to 2-2.
27. See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 102-111.
28. See Catherine Williams et al., Cohabitation and Intestacy: Public Opinion and
Law Reform, 20 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 499, 500-01 (2008) (finding low rates of will
making among cohabitants and persons in low socio-economic groups, blacks, and
minorities in the United Kingdom). Another British study showed that only twelve
percent of cohabitants made wills or changed prior wills to reflect the fact that they
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or fail to change them when their living situation changes—intestacy
statutes provide for post-mortem distribution to the persons generally
assumed to be those to whom the decedent would have wanted to leave his
or her property. Yet one should not assume from the failure of a deceased
cohabitant to execute a will that he or she would prefer to leave the estate
to blood relatives rather than to the surviving partner.29
In the absence of a will, even the biological child of a cohabiting parent
may have difficulty inheriting, if that parent happens to be the father. In
Labine v. Vincent,30 for example, a male cohabitant died after living with a
woman for seven years, during which time they had a daughter, whom he
acknowledged and supported during his lifetime. When he died without a
will, however, neither his cohabitant nor his child could inherit from him.31
While the Supreme Court subsequently held, in a case involving
inheritance from an unmarried mother, that a state could not preclude an
illegitimate child from inheriting,32 one year later the same court (indeed,
Justice Powell wrote both opinions) held in Lalli v. Lalli, a case involving
inheritance from an unmarried father, that a state could nonetheless require
that there have been an adjudication of paternity according to some stateprescribed procedure during the father’s lifetime.33 Lalli v. Lalli is still
good law,34 and a number of states prescribe procedures that must have
been followed during the lifetime of the father for a child of unmarried
parents to inherit from him.35 Yet in cases like Labine and Lalli, where the
were cohabiting, even though two-thirds of the respondents to the survey thought that,
after two years of living together, cohabitants should have the same intestacy rights as
married spouses, even if they had no children. See Anne Barlow et al., Cohabitation
and the Law: Myths, Money and the Media, in BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES: THE 24TH
REPORT 29, 43, 46 (Alison Park et al. eds., 2008). Of course, in the U.K., with its
more generous welfare provisions and a provision allowing cohabitants to apply for
financial provision even in the face of a will, see infra text accompanying note 81,
cohabitants may not need to worry as much about what their loved ones will do in the
event of their death as they would in the United States.
29. See BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 71.
30. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
31. Id. at 537-40.
32. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
33. 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978).
34. However, the intestacy law in New York, the state where the Lalli case arose,
has been changed to allow inheritance if there was clear and convincing evidence of
paternity from genetic testing or other clear and convincing evidence and the father had
openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own in some fashion. See N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) (McKinney 2010).
35. See Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of
Marital and Non-Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 21-27 (2007); James R.
Robinson, Untangling the “Loose Threads”: Equitable Adoption, Equitable
Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal Family Arrangements, 48 EMORY L.J. 943,
952 (1999); see also Mills v. Edwards, 665 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(denying inheritance to daughter who had been recognized by father but not legitimated
by court decree).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/3

6

Bowman: The New Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabiting Couples and Stepchil

2012]

THE NEW ILLEGITIMACY

443

father was living with and supporting the non-marital child, there is little
motivation to seek a formal adjudication of paternity while he is alive.
The historical reason for special rules limiting inheritance from a child’s
father if the parents never married was the difficulty of proving who the
father was, but this rationale has been undermined by the development of
modern means of genetic testing, which can determine paternity to a high
degree of certainty, even after death.36 A desire to protect the estate of a
decedent’s legitimate children and family was also a factor; the fear was
that a hitherto unknown illegitimate child could show up and delay
settlement of an estate by making a claim against the decedent’s widow and
legitimate children.37 This rationale does not apply, however, in cases
involving stepchildren or cohabitants where the father was in fact living
with the child and mother at the time of his death.38 Although the Uniform
Probate Code regards the marital status of a child’s parents to be irrelevant
to the child’s right to inherit, most states have not adopted its provisions in
this respect.39 Rules specifically applicable to inheritance by children of
cohabiting couples need to be developed.40
If the child’s mother were entitled to inherit, this would presumably
alleviate the problem in most cases, because we could assume that the
mother will use the estate to take care of the needs of her child. In this
respect, stepchildren are differently situated than children of cohabitants
because their biological parents are heirs. The intestacy rules of most states
divide the estate between a surviving spouse and the decedent’s children,
who may of course not be related to one another, apparently out of fear that
surviving spouses may change their minds about the objects of their bounty
after their partner’s death, for example, if they remarry.41 By contrast,
when a couple is unmarried, the surviving cohabitant is not entitled to
36. Combining DNA profiling with genetic marking tests yields an accuracy of
99.999999 percent. Karen A. Hauser, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children:
New Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add Up to the Need for Change, 65 U.
CIN. L. REV. 891, 946-47 (1997). However, it may be difficult to obtain an order of
exhumation. BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 142-43.
37. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hoffman, 544 S.E.2d 387, 388-89 (W. Va. 2001) (noting
that a nonmarital son sued decedent’s widow and daughters six months after his death).
38. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination
against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 356 (2011) (pointing out the
gendered nature of the assumption involved, “that nonmarital fathers who have not
sought legal recognition of parental rights and responsibilities . . . are generally absent”
and have no relationship to their children).
39. Lewis, supra note 35, at 31.
40. A very few persistent courts, nonetheless, have eventually reached a just
resolution of some of these cases. See, e.g., In re Estate of Davis, 250 S.W.3d 768,
770-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (describing how the body of the father was disinterred in
2005 to take and test DNA samples against other relatives of his father, who had died
50 years earlier).
41. See BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 97.
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inherit in the absence of a will: “the law grants the survivor no share at all;
the omission treats the surviving partner as no more a natural object of the
decedent’s bounty than a complete stranger.”42 This is true in the United
States today everywhere but in a few jurisdictions, and the exceptions in
those jurisdictions—common law marriage, a statute imposing a quasicommon law marriage only at death, domestic partnerships, and the
committed relationships doctrine in Washington—are inadequate to address
the situation of most cohabitants.
If an unmarried couple has held themselves out to be husband and wife
and has that reputation, they may be found to have had a common law
marriage in the jurisdictions that still recognize that status.43 A common
law spouse would qualify as an heir in those jurisdictions, and also in one
state that no longer recognizes common law marriage but provides for a
kind of common law marriage status applicable only at death. In New
Hampshire, the relevant statute provides that “[p]ersons cohabiting and
acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be
such, for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them, shall
thereafter be deemed to have been legally married.”44
Most cohabitants today, however, do not feel the need to hold
themselves out as husband and wife but, instead, openly acknowledge that
they are unmarried and thus would not qualify as common law spouses.
Yet case law under the New Hampshire statute shows that the statutory
elements are strictly enforced.45 A recent New Hampshire case illustrates
how the elements required to establish a common law marriage or quasicommon law marriage do not fit the situation of modern cohabitants. In
that case, a woman who cohabited with the decedent for over six years,
shared domestic responsibilities, and gave birth to his child was denied a
spousal share of his estate under the New Hampshire statute because the
two had not referred to one another as husband and wife and did not
represent themselves as such within the community; she said “she
associated the word ‘wife’ with ‘servant’ and refused to be anyone’s
servant . . . [or] anybody’s wife.”46
In states that allow opposite-sex couples to register as domestic partners
42. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L.
REV. 21, 63 (1994).
43. Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah (only if the marriage has been validated by a court or
administrative order), and the District of Columbia recognize common law marriage.
See
Common-Law
Marriage,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=4265 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
44. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (2011).
45. See, e.g., De Lisle v. Smalley, 63 A.2d 240 (N.H. 1949); Hilliard v. Baldwin,
80 A. 139 (N.H. 1911).
46. In re Estate of Bourassa, 949 A.2d 704, 707 (N.H. 2008).
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under state statutes that include inheritance as one of the benefits of
domestic partnership, a cohabitant and his or her child would be
protected.47 Most opposite-sex cohabitants do not live in states where they
may register as domestic partners. At present, only Illinois, Maine,
Nevada, and the District of Columbia allow opposite-sex cohabitants of
childbearing age to register.48 Moreover, the majority of cohabitants, both
of the same and opposite sex, fail to register for a variety of reasons over
which their children have no control.49 Indeed, the most vulnerable groups
of cohabitants are the least likely to register, making domestic partnerships
an inadequate remedy for handling inheritance among cohabitants.50
In the state of Washington, cohabitants may be awarded an equitable
share of their partner’s property upon death if they qualify under the factors
set forth for what were previously called “meretricious relationships” but
are now called “committed relationships.”51 Washington recognizes
couples who are in marital-like relationships for purposes of property
distribution both upon dissolution of their union and upon the death of one
partner.52 Recent case law demonstrates, however, that it is difficult to
qualify as partners for this purpose, especially in the inheritance context.
Cohabitants are required to show that they satisfy a number of factors,

47. Nonetheless, domestic partners would not receive the unlimited marital
deduction for property passing at death, so long as the federal Defense of Marriage Act
is not declared unconstitutional. See Thomas P. Gallanis, The Flexible Family in Three
Dimensions, 28 LAW & INEQ. 291, 302 (2010).
48. See Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, H.B. 2234,
96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011) (providing procedures for the certification
and registration of a civil union); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2011) (setting
up domestic partnership registration); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-102 (2011)
(giving registered domestic partners the status of a surviving spouse as an intestate
share); NEV. REV. STAT., tit. 11, § 122A.200(1)(c) (2009); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, §
8000 (2011) (establishing domestic partnerships to allow cohabitants access to the
rights provided by the Health Care Expansion Act); Domestic Partnership Equality
Amendment Act of 2006, 53 D.C. Reg. 1035 (Feb. 17, 2006) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of D.C. Code) (granting domestic partners similar rights and
responsibilities to those currently held by spousal couples). Although California has
domestic partnerships open to some opposite-sex couples, one member of the couple
must be age sixty-two or over. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West 2004 & Supp.
2011).
49. For example, if one partner wants to register and the other does not, there is no
protection.
50. See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 226-29; see also Reg Graycar & Jenni Milbank,
From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to
Partnership Recognition, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 121, 131 (2007) (“[T]hose most vulnerable
are also those least likely to formally register their relationships and legal affairs, . . .”).
51. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 739 (Wash. 2001) (en banc); Olver v.
Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 354 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
52. Olver, 168 P.3d at 355; Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 837 (Wash. 1995)
(en banc) (establishing the status of and setting the standard for a “meritorious”
relationship in a case involving heterosexual cohabitants).
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including that they pooled their resources for joint projects.53 Recent cases
have made clear that one cannot show a committed relationship in the
absence of pooling resources.54 Thus, although a cohabitant does not have
to refer to his or her partner as a wife or husband in Washington, the couple
still needs to have behaved economically like a couple in a traditional
marriage.
Nonetheless, a child of cohabiting parents may be protected by this
provision of Washington law if both cohabitants die at the same time. In
Olver v. Fowler, a cohabiting couple died simultaneously in an auto
accident, and another victim of the accident sued the father’s estate for
damages.55 The Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, held that the
cohabitants’ surviving child should inherit the fifty percent share that
would have been awarded to his mother under its case law on committed
relationships.56 Although that child would have inherited the estates of
both parents in any event, holding that half of the father’s estate had passed
to the parent who was not driving the car shielded that money from claims
in the tort action. In most cases, though, children of cohabitants will
benefit only if the surviving cohabitant shares the inheritance with them.
With these few exceptions, children living in cohabiting families are
virtually never able to inherit from the cohabitant who stands in the
position of a stepparent to them.57 I have only been able to locate one case
in which this occurred. In a 1959 case, the Ohio Supreme Court considered
the question whether the term “stepchildren” in the state’s probate act
included illegitimate stepchildren as well.58 The only reason this question
arose was that Ohio’s probate act includes stepchildren as possible heirs in
situations where a decedent has no other heirs and the estate would
otherwise escheat to the state. In this situation, the court found no
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate stepchildren; in either case,
it said, they would be related by affinity, either by marriage to or
cohabitation with their parent, and that affinity was not terminated by the
53. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834.
54. See Seven v. Stoel Rives, LLP, No. 64117-4-I, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 2785,

*11 (Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2010) (holding that a cohabitant of ten years standing who took
care of the decedent until he died did not qualify because they had not pooled their
resources for joint projects). I hasten to add that this case was probably rightly
decided, if on the wrong ground, because he had provided quite generously for her in a
will.
55. Olver, 168 P.3d at 351.
56. Id. at 357 (holding that “when a committed intimate relationship is terminated
by the death of both parties, the couple’s jointly acquired property can be equitably
divided between the partners’ estates”).
57. See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 158 (1996).
58. See Kest v. Lewis (Kest II), 159 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1959); see also Kest v. State
(Kest I), 146 N.E.2d 755 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1957).
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fact that the mother had predeceased her partner.59 The court was
obviously stretching the meaning of the word “affinity” to reach this
conclusion.
If there are any other heirs available, even stepchildren whose parents
are formally married are not eligible to inherit in the absence of a will or
unless they have been adopted by the stepparent.60 Stepparent adoption is
rare, for a variety of reasons.61 Adoption requires terminating the parental
rights of the child’s noncustodial parent, who is likely to object; and a
stepparent may not wish to put the child in a position of choosing between
him or her and the child’s natural parent, and may not feel the need to do
so.62 One state, California, attempts to address this problem by providing
in its probate law for inheritance by stepchildren who have been “equitably
adopted.”63 This doctrine requires that stepchildren show that they would
have been adopted in the absence of legal obstacles to doing so, such as the
refusal of the other parent to consent.64 But the doctrine is interpreted very
narrowly, with California courts refusing to extend it to cases where the
stepchild is an adult and the adoption could thus have been effectuated
without parental consent during the decedent’s lifetime after the stepchild
reached the age of majority.65 Moreover, even second-parent adoption,
under which stepparents may adopt without terminating the parental rights
of their own spouse or partner, is difficult, costly, and only available in
some jurisdictions.66
59. Kest II, 159 N.E.2d at 450-51 (holding that the Ohio probate code does not
distinguish between stepchildren based on legitimacy).
60. BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 156-58.
61. Kathleen A. Lamb, “I Want to Be Just Like Their Real Dad”: Factors
Associated with Stepfather Adoption, 28. J. FAM. ISSUES 1162, 1183 (2007) (finding
that only 26 of 378 stepfathers in the study finalized a stepparent adoption, citing
various reasons, including the time and emotional commitment that adoption entails,
the need for the child to cut ties with their non-custodial parent, and the stepparent
having other nonresidential children).
62. See Feigenbaum, supra note 24, at 180 (“Even if a biological parent is
deceased, the subject of adoption may create psychological dilemmas for stepchildren
who will not want to reject their deceased biological parents or offend their
stepparents.”).
63. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 2011); BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 156-57
(noting that California allows a stepchild to inherit if the relationship began during and
continued since the child’s minority and if the stepparent would have adopted the child
but for a legal barrier).
64. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454(b).
65. In re Estate of Joseph, 849 P.2d 472 (Cal. 1998) (denying use of the equitable
adoption doctrine to an adult stepchild).
66. Second-parent adoption assumes that the child has only one legally recognized
parent and is being adopted by a second parental figure who has a non-marital
relationship with the child’s parent. See Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the
Step-Partner Adoption Paradigm: Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate
Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 351, 374-804 (2005) (concluding that the courts’
distinction between second-parent adoption and stepparent adoption “constitutes shades

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

11

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 3

448

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:3

It is even more difficult for an unmarried cohabitant to adopt his or her
partner’s child. Some states—New York, for example—do allow secondparent adoption by heterosexual cohabitants, although the doctrine was
initially recognized to address the somewhat different problems of lesbian
co-parents.67 For example, second-parent adoption does not resolve the
barrier raised if the noncustodial biological parent refuses to consent to the
adoption, an unlikely obstacle in a lesbian co-parent case where the other
biological parent is an anonymous sperm donor. Moreover, some states
outright prohibit adoption by opposite-sex cohabitants, either to effect a
second-parent adoption or even to jointly adopt an unrelated child.68
Although most adoption statutes provide that a single person or a married
couple may jointly adopt, they say nothing specific about joint adoptions
by unmarried couples, leaving it to judges to decide whether “single
person” includes its plural and thus includes unmarried couples by
inference.69 A few states have revised their statutes to make it explicit that
of the discrimination the law used to practice with respect to the inheritance rights of
illegitimate children”); Susan E. Dalton, Protecting Our Parent-Child Relationships:
Understanding the Strengths and Weaknesses of Second-Parent Adoption, in QUEER
FAMILIES, QUEER POLITICS: CHALLENGING CULTURE AND THE STATE 214 (Mary
Bernstein & Renate Reimann eds., 2001) (comparing the cost of a marriage certificate
($50) and the costs of second-parent adoption ($4,000-$6,000 per child)).
67. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that the unmarried
partner of a child’s biological mother, whether heterosexual or homosexual, who is
raising the child with the biological parent, can become the child’s second parent
through adoption); see also In re Adoption of Carl, 709 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Fam. Ct. 2000)
(relying on “the best interests of the child” test to uphold an adoption by unmarried
man and woman of a child who is biologically not related to either); In re Adoption of
Joseph, 684 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Surr. Ct. Oneida Co. 1998) (finding no reason not to extend
the right to adopt to unmarried foster parents).
68. See, e.g., In re Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522, 522 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that two
single people jointly applying to adopt did not qualify as “a single person” under the
statute); In re Jason C., 533 A.2d 32, 33-34 (N.H. 1987) (finding that the domestic
circumstances of people who are neither single and living alone nor married and
applying jointly are too disruptive for the child to be adopted). Arkansas has recently
joined this group, causing considerable controversy. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304 (West
2009) (stating that a minor cannot be adopted if the individual seeking to adopt them is
“cohabitating with a sexual partner outside of a marriage that is valid under the
Arkansas Constitution”); see Catherine L. Hartz, Arkansas’s Unmarried Couple
Adoption Ban: Depriving Children of Families, 63 ARK. L. REV. 113, 118-24 (2010)
(arguing that the ban is unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, the Arkansas Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because its main purpose is to exclude homosexual couples
from becoming adoptive parents, not the best interest of the child); Mark Strasser,
Adoption, Best Interests, and the Arkansas Constitution, 63 ARK. L. REV. 3, 21-29
(2010) (arguing that, although the statutory ban is neutral on its face, it was in fact
motivated by animus given that the justifications presented by the government are
implausible and not rationally related to any state interest); Lynn D. Wardle,
Comparative Perspectives on Adoption of Children Cohabiting, Nonmarital Couples
and Partners, 63 ARK. L. REV. 31, 32-33 (2010) (defending the ban as “socially
responsible, legally well-accepted, and scientifically well-justified public policy”).
69. See In re Jacob, 620 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641-42 (App. Div. 1994) (Green & Balio,
JJ., dissenting), rev’d, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405-06 (N.Y. 1995).
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unmarried couples are eligible to effect second-parent adoptions, but only a
few have done so.70 In any event, a successful second-parent adoption by
cohabitants would result in a family in which each cohabitant is related to
the child but the co-parents are legal strangers to one another, while many
family benefits depend upon spousal status.71
In short, the children of cohabitants, and stepchildren in most cases, are
not included as heirs under state intestacy laws. Whether their parents are
married or not, there is clearly a need for law reform in this area to bring
the law into line both with family structures that have become increasingly
common and with the purposes of intestacy law.72 Intestacy law is
intended to direct the distribution of property upon death to the persons
assumed to be those to whom it would have been bequeathed if the
decedent had made a will. In every state, that person’s spouse and children
are assumed to be first in line. This is not just a matter of assumed
affection; it is inextricably tied to the nature of the family as an economic
unit, one in which the members depend upon one another for support—
support that is replaced upon death by the transfer of property. For this
reason, if a testator tries to disinherit a spouse, the elective share prevents
this from happening because, as one scholar states, “[h]istorically the
principal purpose of the elective share (and its predecessor, dower) was to
support or protect the surviving spouse and the couple’s young children.”73
In short, inheritance is intended to provide posthumous support, and this
70. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(a)(3) (West 2011) (“[A]ny parent of a
minor child may agree in writing with one other person who shares parental
responsibility for the child with such parent that the other person shall adopt or join in
the adoption of the child, if the parental rights, if any, of any other person other than the
parties to such agreement have been terminated.”).
71. Dalton, supra note 66, at 212-13 (pointing out that a vast majority of legal
benefits and protections afforded to families are “funneled through the spousal
relationship”).
72. Other students of this issue have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g.,
Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199,
200-04 (2001) (arguing that inheritance law continues to define people in terms of the
traditional family structure, thus failing to recognize the full range of today’s family
units, and therefore that reformers should confront and reconsider the family paradigm
itself); Peter J. Harrington, Note, Untying the Knot: Extending Intestacy Benefits to
Non-Traditional Families by Severing the Link to Marriage, 25 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON.
DEV. 323, 323-24, 327 (2011) (citing the 2000 Census, which found 11 million people,
same sex and opposite sex, living with an unmarried partner (a seventy-two percent
increase) and arguing that, if the trend continues, non-traditional family structures will
comprise the majority of American households; thus the UPC should be amended to
add “committed partner” near the top of the intestacy hierarchy); Marissa J. Holob,
Note, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing
the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1492, 1493-1495 (2000)
(arguing that the UPC categories should be extended to include domestic partners
because U.S. law is biased towards the traditional family and “[u]nless . . . voluntary
protections have been created, the survivor of . . . an unmarried couple, homosexual or
heterosexual, stands completely without inheritance rights”).
73. BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 74.
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yields a substantial benefit to society at large, protecting family members
who might otherwise need state support.74
We have by now considerable empirical evidence that cohabitants in fact
desire that their property should devolve to their cohabitants and children if
they fail to make wills. Mary Louise Fellows’ 1998 study convincingly
demonstrated that both opposite- and same-sex cohabitants and the general
public think that the majority of a cohabitant’s estate should go to his or her
surviving cohabitant and their children.75 Seventy-five to eighty percent of
opposite-sex cohabitants in the study would give at least half or more of the
estate to the surviving partner if there were no children; and a substantial
number (twenty to thirty percent) would give the entire estate.76 As an
additional indication that the surviving cohabitant was the natural object of
their bounty, over fifty-eight percent of those who had made wills and had
no children indicated that they had named their partner as sole
beneficiary.77 Moreover, if a cohabiting couple in the scenario presented to
respondents had children in their household, the prevalent pattern was to
split the estate between partner and children, including a partner’s child
from a previous relationship.78
Empirical studies carried out in Britain report similar findings. A large
majority of the British public believes that surviving cohabitants should
inherit, especially if they have children.79 A British Attitudes Survey in
2008 indicated that two-thirds of respondents believed that cohabitants of
two years or longer should have the same rights in this respect as spouses,
even if they had no children.80 Yet another study confirmed that the length
of relationship and presence of children were more important to people’s
attitudes on this issue than the marital status of the partners.81 Notably, the
74. See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW &
INEQ. 1, 11-12 (2000) (describing succession laws as “an attempt to express the family
in terms of property,” strengthen family ties, and provide incentives to remain
connected with family members, thus carrying both economic and psychological
benefits).
75. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An
Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3-4, 89 (1998) (discussing a 1994 study of
approximately seven percent of couples in the United States who were in unmarried,
committed relationships).
76. See id. at 36-45.
77. See id. at 44.
78. See id. at 73-76.
79. Williams et al., supra note 28, at 514-17.
80. Barlow et al., supra note 28, at 46 (comparing this result based upon a duration
of two years with a result based on ten years of cohabitation, in which 94% of
respondents believe that cohabitants should have the same rights as spouses, especially
in terms of inheritance rights); see also Gillian Douglas et al., Enduring Love?
Attitudes to Family and Inheritance Law in England and Wales, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 245,
250 (2011).
81. Williams et al., supra note 28, at 517.
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“inheritance family” still included a narrow range of persons—a spouse or
partner and their children.82 Interviewees’ responses revealed that the
values underlying their choices, in addition to blood ties, were: the sharing
of a common life, emotional closeness, dependency, need, and support.83
Studies such as these have supported scholars’ recommendations for
reforming intestacy law to take account of the reported preferences.
Lawrence Waggoner’s proposed intestacy statute would set up an intestate
share for a de facto partner based on a presumption that cohabitants have
the necessary marriage-like relationship if they lived together for five out
of the six years preceding the decedent’s death, were registered as domestic
partners, or were the parents of a minor child living in their household.84
Gary Spitko proposes that unregistered committed partners accrue
inheritance rights over time, beginning with eighteen percent of the
intestate estate after three years and reaching 100 percent at fifteen years of
cohabitation.85 Another scholar suggests that the law should presume
testamentary intent to benefit any child who has been living with a
cohabiting couple during the child’s minority for a period long enough to
establish a parent-child bond, if the decedent had supported the child and
treated it as his or her own.86 This proposal is somewhat similar to the
provision for family maintenance in the U.K., under which any person
living with and being supported by a decedent at the time of his or her
death may apply for an award of maintenance.87 Under this provision, a
decedent’s cohabitant and any children living with the cohabiting couple
for two years prior to his or her death may ask the court for a reasonable
financial allowance if the intestacy rules or a will have left them without
reasonable means of support. This remedy is more than cohabitants
currently have in the United States, but it is still inferior to reforming the
intestacy laws to take account of cohabitants, because the family
82.
83.
84.
85.

Douglas et al., supra note 80, at 263.
Id. at 263-68.
Waggoner, supra note 42, at 78-84.
E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance
Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255, 345 (2003); see also
Jennifer Seidman, Functional Families and Dysfunctional Laws: Committed Partners
and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211, 232-52 (2004) (discussing a variety
of proposals for including unmarried partners in intestate succession).
86. Gary, supra note 74, at 71-77 (creating a functional approach to defining the
parent-child relationship by looking at the following factors: (1) the relationship began
during the child’s minority; (2) the duration of the relationship; (3) the decedent was
married to or the committed partner of the biological or adoptive parent of the child; (4)
the decedent held the child out as his/her child; (5) the decedent provided economic and
emotional support; (6) treatment of the child was comparable to the decedent’s legal
children; and (7) the decedent named the child or parent as a beneficiary to receive
property upon death).
87. Inheritance Act, 1975, c. 63, § 1 (Eng.).
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maintenance provision in the U.K. is limited to reasonable needs, is highly
discretionary, and is costly to obtain.88
I propose instead that the intestacy laws be amended to add cohabitants,
their children, and stepchildren as potential heirs after they have lived
together for two years or a child is born—the preconditions I set in my
previous work as appropriate to assume economic interdependence.89 An
elective share for cohabitants should also be provided, one that is
comparable to the elective share given a spouse. Although omitted from
Waggoner’s proposed statute, it is inconsistent to treat a cohabitant
differently from a spouse based on whether the decedent left a will or not.90
Any biological children will inherit from him or her anyway, and
cohabiting stepchildren will presumably be taken care of by the surviving
cohabitant, who is their biological parent, or eventually inherit that parent’s
share.
It is still necessary to determine the size of the intestate share to be
assigned to children of the decedent’s partner. Mary Louise Fellows’ study
indicated that, although there was substantial support for treating a
partner’s child who has lived in the household as an heir, most people were
not inclined to treat that child precisely as if it were their own biological
child.91 One alternative would be to establish some test to decide whether a
particular stepchild should be included and leave it to the judge to
determine the share according to some guidelines, as Margaret Mahoney
suggests with respect to inheritance by stepchildren of married parents.92
This would result in case-by-case determinations involving the type of
uncertainty and unpredictability loathed by probate judges, who prefer
easily determinable heirs. Mahoney argues that the courts’ desires in this
respect are inconsistent with the complexity of modern families and do not
respect the central role of inheritance within family law: “[r]ecognition of
family relationships in the wealth transmission process is an important
aspect of the protection that the legal system extends to families.”93 While
88. Williams et al., supra note 28, at 504-05.
89. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 224-26. If the remedies proposed in my book were

adopted, reform of the intestacy law would be unnecessary because cohabitants would
be treated as though they were married after two years or the birth of a child. Since
those reforms do not seem to be imminent, short-term fixes are in order.
90. See BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 78.
91. See Fellows et al., supra note 75, at 83.
92. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 928-36 (proposing a test similar to the in loco
parentis doctrine, including voluntary assumption of parental duties beginning during
minority and lasting through the joint lifetimes of stepparent and stepchild).
93. Id. at 949. Ralph Brashier believes that stepchildren will continue to be
excluded from inheritance “as long as the drafters of American inheritance law
continue to shun individualized, discretionary probate determinations of what
constitutes a family.” See BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 158.
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agreeing with her conclusion that stepchildren—to which I would add those
living with unmarried parents—should be recognized, I favor a balancing
of interests that avoids costly legal proceedings to make the determination
about a particular child. I would thus provide a strong presumption that all
children living in the decedent’s family be treated equally, to be rebutted
only by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent would have had a
different intent. To counteract this rule, any cohabitant may make a will
distinguishing among his or her children and stepchildren and may, in any
states but Louisiana and Massachusetts, make no provision at all for some
of them.94 My rule simply shifts the default in favor of protecting all
children living in the decedent’s household.
II. GOVERNMENT BENEFITS WHEN A PARENT DIES
Inheritance is not the only mechanism by which the welfare of dependent
children is protected upon the death of a parent. Social security survivors’
benefits and workers’ compensation statutes provide additional protections
that operate as posthumous support for children who have been dependent
upon a wage earner. In this section, I describe the ways in which children
of cohabitants and, to a lesser extent, stepchildren are treated in a
discriminatory fashion by both of these benefit systems and make
suggestions for legal reform to address these problems.
A. Social Security
The primary government benefits payable upon the death or disability of
a wage earner are those available under the Social Security Act.95 A
94. A forced share is provided for children under twenty-four or disabled in
Louisiana. See BRASHIER, supra note 23, at 98-99; see also NANCY D. POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW
188 (2008) (stating that every state except Louisiana and Massachusetts places
protection of the spouse above protection of the child under intestacy law).
95. Because this discussion is limited to benefits payable upon death, I omit the
many other ways in which cohabitants’ children and stepchildren may be treated
differently than legitimate children under federal law. For information about their
current treatment under the tax law, TANF, food stamps, and immigration, see Stephen
D. Sugarman, What Is a “Family”? Conflicting Messages from Our Public Programs,
42 FAM. L.Q. 231, 236-44, 252-55 (2008) (discussing how Social Security and tax law
now include stepchildren and children born out of wedlock, Food Stamps is by far the
most inclusive of non-traditional families, and immigration law still narrowly defines
family as including only biological and adoptive children); Wendell E. Primus &
Jennifer Beeson, Safety Net Programs, Marriage, and Cohabitation, in JUST LIVING
TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND SOCIAL
POLICY, 191, 196-210 (Alan Booth et al. eds., 2002) (comparing treatment of married,
cohabiting, and single-parent families under Medicaid, food stamps, federal housing
programs, and taxation); Anne E. Winkler, The Complexity of Tax and Transfer
Program Rules Regarding Cohabitation: Challenges and Implications, in JUST LIVING
TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND SOCIAL
POLICY 237, 239, 242-43 (Alan Booth et al. eds., 2002) (recommending that a new tax
filing status be created to include cohabitants with children in common, thus placing
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cohabitant is not eligible for benefits under the act unless he or she would
be considered a spouse under the state law where the decedent was
domiciled, excluding all but common law spouses domiciled in states that
recognize that status.96 Widows or widowers, including common law
widows or widowers, and even divorced spouses who were married to the
wage earner for ten years and have not remarried are all entitled to
survivors benefits for themselves and also for “mother’s insurance
benefits” as well.97 While conceding that mother’s insurance benefits were
meant to allow a surviving parent to stay home and look after the
decedent’s surviving child, the Supreme Court held in Califano v. Boles,98
by a five-to-four vote, that the mother of an illegitimate child was not
eligible for these benefits, largely on grounds of administrative
convenience.99 Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, saw mother’s insurance
benefits as accruing to the mother and only incidentally to her child, who
had received benefits in his own right.100 The four dissenting judges, by
contrast, saw denial of these benefits to illegitimate children as
discrimination against them: denying benefits to enable their caretaker to
stay home and care for them constituted a denial of assistance to the
children themselves and penalized them for their parents’ marital status.101
Moreover, they argued, using “marital status as an index of dependency on
a deceased wage earner” did not bear a sufficient—in their description,
“substantial”—relationship to the purposes of the provision for mother’s

these non-traditional families on equal footing with married couples).
96. Social Security Act § 216(h)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
Same-sex couples are currently excluded from this protection by the federal Defense of
Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, an exclusion currently being challenged in federal court.
See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding, in
case challenging this and other exclusions, that DOMA was unconstitutional under the
rational basis test).
97. By contrast, the surviving partner of an unmarried cohabitant in a meretricious
relationship in the state of Washington was denied social security benefits; she did not
qualify as a “widow,” despite twenty years of continuous cohabitation, because the
Washington Supreme Court held that she was not an heir under the state’s intestacy
laws, despite the fact that she was eligible for property division at the end of the
relationship. See Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Wash. 1989) (en
banc).
98. 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (holding that, under the rational basis test, Congress could
rationally choose to concentrate limited funds where it has determined need to be the
greatest, thereby limiting the class of individuals to receive said benefits).
99. Id. at 283-86, 288-89 (placing particular emphasis on the legislative and
administrative problems inherent in designing such a nation-wide program such as
Social Security).
100. Id. at 294 (claiming that the program was “not designed to be, and we think it is
not now, a general system for the dispensing of child-care subsidies”).
101. See id. at 297-304 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the entire structure
of the statute belies the Court’s determination that Congress intended to aid a wageearner’s spouse rather than his children”).
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insurance.102 Because these arguments lost by a narrow margin, the
surviving parent of a cohabitant’s child is deprived of benefits to allow
caring for them. This would not be so with respect to stepchildren.
Although a cohabitant’s partner is ineligible for social security upon the
death or disability of an insured wage earner, their biological children may
receive benefits. Illegitimate children were originally excluded from
coverage, but the act was amended in 1965 to include them.103 The
Supreme Court has said that the purpose of social security survivors’
benefits for children is to replace the support of the wage-earner parent.104
An illegitimate child, however, must first provide sufficient proof of the
parent-child relationship. To qualify, the child must be eligible to inherit
under the state’s intestacy law, or the parent-child relationship must have
been acknowledged in writing by the decedent prior to death or established
in a court order of paternity or child support, or the decedent must have
been “shown by evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner of Social
Security to have been the mother or father of the applicant, and such
insured individual was living with or contributing to the support of the
applicant at the time such insured individual died.”105
In addition to paternity, children of unmarried parents are required to
demonstrate actual dependency upon the wage earner at the time of death,
which is presumed in the case of legitimate children who are minors.106
This is more than a procedural hurdle because, if cohabitants separate prior
to the wage earner’s death, their children are no longer eligible. This was
the situation, for example, in Mathews v. Lucas, where the unmarried
couple lived together for eighteen years and had two minor children who
were supported by their father up until the parents separated two years
before his death.107 Because the children were unable to establish actual
dependency at the time of death, they were unable to collect survivors’
benefits, despite the fact that, as the dissent pointed out, they were entitled

102. Id. at 297-98.
103. Sugarman, supra note 95, at 237-38 (describing how since the 1950s the

scheme has been amended to recognize some non-traditional family types, such as
including nearly all stepchildren and illegitimate children).
104. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974) (stating, in case
holding that denying disability benefits to illegitimate child born after the onset of
disability violates the equal protection clause, that “the primary purpose . . . is to
provide for dependents of a disabled wage earner”); see also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535, 538 (1973) (holding that natural father is liable for child support for child born out
of wedlock because “there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying
such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its
mother”).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) (2006).
106. Id. § 402(d)(3)(A).
107. See 427 U.S. 495, 497 (1976).
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to support from him even if they were not actually receiving it.108
The early cases on the constitutionality of classifications based upon
illegitimacy were decided on the assumption that the appropriate
constitutional level of scrutiny was the rational relationship test.109 The
Court repeatedly rejected an argument that strict scrutiny be applied, with
the Mathews Court specifically stating that “discrimination against
illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes.”110
While rejecting strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court described the appropriate
level of scrutiny for classifications based on illegitimacy as nonetheless
higher than mere rational relationship, describing it initially as “not
toothless”111 and later as requiring that the classification be “substantially
related to permissible state interests.”112 This is not exactly the “substantial
relation to an important state interest” test for intermediate scrutiny set out
in Craig v. Boren,113 but it is close. Ultimately, in 1988, in considering a
case about the statute of limitations for proof of paternity, Justice
O’Connor proclaimed that intermediate scrutiny was indeed the standard
applied in cases involving classifications based on illegitimacy, which must
therefore be substantially related to an important governmental interest, not
just rationally related to some legitimate state interest.114 One wonders if
the distinctions upheld in Mathews would have been upheld as substantially
related to an important governmental objective, rather than as merely not
arbitrary. Is requiring that an illegitimate child actually be receiving
support from his or her insured parent at the time of death substantially
related to the government’s goal of replacing parental support to which the
child was in fact entitled? Is administrative convenience an adequate
governmental interest to uphold such a requirement?115 Given the absence
of legal aid attorneys able to litigate all these issues as they did in the
1970s, we may never know the answers to these questions.
108. Id. at 517-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., id. at 515-16 (majority opinion); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-

72 (1968) (stating that the court’s role is merely to decide whether Congress’s
assumptions are so inconsistent as not to be reasonably supportive of its justification
for the classification).
110. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
111. Id. at 510.
112. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). See generally Hauser, supra note
36.
113. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
114. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
115. Administrative convenience was found not to be a sufficiently important state
interest in, for example, Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-202 (striking down gender difference in
age at which beer could be purchased), and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979)
(striking down gender-specific alimony payments).
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Stepchildren of married parents are also disadvantaged under the social
security statute, unless they have been adopted.116 In addition to being
required to prove that they were actually dependent on the decedent at
death, which may be presumed if they were living in the same household,
stepchildren’s parents must have been married at least twelve months
earlier and nine months in the case of disability benefits.117 According to
the Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Salfi,118 Congress intended this
durational requirement to prevent sham marriages for the sake of
conferring benefits – even though, as the dissent pointed out, this had never
been shown to be a problem and, in any event, could easily be remedied by
allowing rebuttal by a showing of good health at the time of marriage.119
The Weinberger Court nonetheless upheld the requirement as rationally
related to Congress’ intent, a bright line rule chosen in the interest of
efficiency in adjudicating the millions of social security claims each
year.120 A cohabitant’s stepchild, by contrast, is ineligible for benefits, no
matter how dependent he or she has been upon the decedent, because of
inability to establish the necessary relatedness.121
In sum, a child living with an unmarried couple is eligible for social
security survivors’ benefits from his or her biological parent’s account so
long as he or she jumps through the right procedural hoops and is actually
dependent at the time the insured person dies. An unadopted stepchild is
eligible so long as his or her parents have been married long enough at the
time of the insured’s death or disability and they do not divorce before
then.122 Stepchildren lose their eligibility if the couple divorces, no matter
how long the marriage or period of support and without regard to whether
they are still dependent on the former stepparent.123 Nonetheless, many,
perhaps most, stepchildren and children living with their biological but
unmarried parents will be eligible for social security benefits because
application of the statute turns primarily upon being a dependent of the
insured person.124 By contrast, stepchildren of unmarried parents, like
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(2) (2006).
See id. § 416(e).
422 U.S. 749 (1975).
See id. at 803-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 781-83.
§§ 402(d), 416(e).
Id. § 402(d)(1)(H).
See Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal
Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445, 475-77 (1995) (arguing that a
stepchild should receive a deceased’s benefits despite divorce); see also Margaret M.
Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 531-34 (1987)
(supporting use of a continuing marital relationship as a reasonable objective test of
actual dependency).
124. See Sugarman, supra note 95, at 237-38.
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cohabitants themselves, are never eligible, despite their dependence on the
decedent. In short, although federal law is often praised as following a
functional model based on dependence,125 this is not always the case.
I recommend that the social security act be amended so as to treat the
children of cohabitants similarly to children of married parents, with
respect to benefits to them and to mother’s insurance benefits.
Stepchildren living with both married and unmarried parents should receive
benefits if they either were actually dependent upon the insured person at
the time of his or her death or had a right to support from the decedent that
was not being fulfilled.
B. Workers’ Compensation
Like social security, workers’ compensation statutes typically adopt a
dependency-based standard that may result in payments to functional
families. Workers compensation’ benefits are paid by the employer, not
the government, but they are administered by the state and give benefits to
dependents upon the death or disability of an employee in a workplace
accident according to a set schedule.126 Awards are set by state law at a
particular amount for a particular injury (including death), which is then
split among the eligible dependents; thus one person’s share diminishes
that of another.127
One of the first in the line of cases challenging classifications based on
illegitimacy was Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,128 a challenge to a
Louisiana workers compensation statute that discriminated against
dependent unacknowledged illegitimate children. In Weber, the employee
had four older and legitimate minor children from a marriage which had
never been dissolved, and also four children by the woman with whom he
cohabited up until the time of his death, two of whom were acknowledged,
one of whom had never been acknowledged, although there was no dispute
about paternity, and one born posthumously.129 The Louisiana statute
provided that unacknowledged illegitimate children were not to participate
in workers compensation awards if the maximum had been exhausted by
125. See, e.g., Sarah E. C. Malia, Balancing Family Members’ Interests Regarding
Stepparent Rights and Obligations: A Social Policy Challenge, 54 FAM. REL. 298, 301
(2005) (noting that federal social welfare regulations focus on family needs).
126. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN, ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 834 (8th ed. 2006).
127. See POLIKOFF, supra note 94, at 201. David Chambers has said that workers
compensation and social security survivors’ benefits were the least controversial areas
in which to award benefits to cohabitants because the award of benefits does not take
anything away from anyone else. See Chambers, supra note 11, at 110. This is
generally true with respect to social security but not workers compensation awards.
128. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
129. See id. at 165.
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awards to the legitimate and acknowledged illegitimate children, thus
leaving out two of his children.130 The Supreme Court held that it was
unconstitutional to treat the decedent’s children differently based upon the
circumstances of their birth, distinguishing this case from Labine v.
Vincent,131 in which the father could have legitimated or formally
acknowledged his child before he died, whereas in Weber the decedent was
never divorced from his wife and thus could not marry the mother of his
younger children.132
The Weber case illustrates an interesting anomaly about this line of
jurisprudence. Children of someone who is in effect bigamous may receive
better treatment, as in Weber, where the Court used the decedent’s marriage
to someone else to excuse his failure to legitimate them, than children of
cohabiting couples who could in fact marry.133 Of course, there may be
other reasons why the early cases on illegitimacy were decided the way
they were. The facts in these cases were attractive in a way that may have
caused the Court to overlook bigamy. In Weber, the husband was in a Jane
Eyre situation—that is, his wife was in a mental institution.134 And the
disabled cohabitant claiming social security benefits on behalf of his two
after-born children in Jimenez v. Weinberger had been abandoned by their
mother and was in fact caring for all of their children by himself, despite
his disability.135 Moreover, the favorable decisions reflected the Burger
Court, while the newly-appointed Justice Rehnquist was waiting in the
wings, dissenting.136
Whether the child of a cohabitant will qualify for a workers
compensation award depends on the language of the statute in the state
130. See id. at 166 n.2, 167.
131. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
132. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 170-71. Despite the mandate of Weber, there are

indications that Louisiana may have treated unacknowledged illegitimate children
differently for some years, relegating them to the class of “other dependents” under the
statute, who receive a lower amount. See Winn v. Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co.,
522 So. 2d 137, 141-44 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that unacknowledged illegitimate
child must be treated exactly like other children rather than as “other dependents” but
that cohabitant who was child’s mother was entitled to receive lower benefits as an
“other dependent”).
133. For example, the child’s father in Jimenez v. Weinberger was also married to
someone else but living with another woman at the time he became disabled; the
cohabitants had one child at that time, whom he was supporting, and subsequently had
two more, all of whom he acknowledged as his own. See 417 U.S. 628, 630 (1974).
The Supreme Court held that those children must be allowed to prove their dependency
in the face of the statute’s plain language that illegitimate children born after the onset
of the disability are barred from receiving disability benefits. See id. at 634-37.
134. 406 U.S. at 165.
135. 417 U.S. at 630.
136. See generally id. at 638-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Weber, 406 U.S. at 17785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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where the accident occurs. Many of these statutes are written so as to cover
“dependents” of a worker who has died or been injured in a workplace
accident; they are clearly intended to provide for family members who have
lost the wage earner upon whom they depend. This legislative intent would
seem to dictate that a dependent cohabitant would qualify for benefits, but
many courts have refused recovery by cohabitants on grounds of public
policy.137 In New York, for example, except for surviving cohabitants
covered by the special 9/11 compensation statute, unmarried couples do not
qualify for workers’ compensation benefits.138 By contrast, in California,
opposite-sex cohabitants and others who are members of the decedent’s
household have been eligible for workers’ compensation benefits since
1979 if they can show that they were dependent upon the worker at the
time of his or her death.139 Oregon reaches a similar result under its statute,
which provides that unmarried opposite-sex couples and their children may
claim workers’ compensation benefits if they lived together for more than
one year prior to the accident and children were born to them as a couple.
In case an unmarried man and an unmarried woman have cohabited in
this state as husband and wife for over one year prior to the date of an
accidental injury received by one or the other as a subject worker, and
children are living as a result of that relation, the surviving cohabitant and
the children are entitled to compensation under this chapter the same as if
the man and woman had been legally married.140
Instead of asking the court to determine if the cohabitant and children
were in fact economically dependent on the worker, Oregon has opted to
rely on the duration of the relationship and the birth of children as proof
that this is probably so. I favor a similar approach, consistent with that
recommended in my book, treating cohabitants as eligible to receive
workers compensation benefits after two years of cohabitation or as soon as
a child is born, and the couple’s children as eligible from birth.

137. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1141 & n.93 (1981) (describing cases denying
workers compensation benefits to cohabitants).
138. See POLIKOFF, supra note 94, at 201.
139. See Dep’t of Indus. Relations v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr.
183, 186 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that claimant who was unmarried to but living with
decedent qualified as a dependent for worker’s compensation purposes); see also Winn
v. Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co., 522 So. 2d 137, 143 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(requiring proof of actual dependency from cohabitant classified as an “other
dependent”).
140. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 656.226 (West 2011); see also Cato v. Alcoa-Reynolds
Metals Co., 152 P.3d 981, 984-85 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the child must still
be a minor for cohabitant to qualify under this provision).
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III. TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES
A number of tort claims, such as a wrongful death suit or a suit seeking
damages for loss of consortium, can also be important means of
compensating for the loss of a parent—and another example of postmortem support. The first two in the line of cases challenging
classifications based on illegitimacy involved claims for wrongful death.
Levy v. Louisiana141 and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins.
Co.142 were companion cases decided on the same day in May 1968, the
first striking down a Louisiana statute denying illegitimate children the
right to sue for the wrongful death of a mother,143 and the second holding
that denial of a mother’s right to sue for the wrongful death of her child
was similarly unconstitutional.144 The Levy Court held that:
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the
wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though
illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured
them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense;
in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent
would.145

Wrongful death suits are intended to compensate a victim’s survivors for
the economic benefit they would have received if the deceased person had
not died as a result of the defendant’s conduct.146 The right to sue for
wrongful death is derived entirely from statute and, thus, depends upon the
wording of the state’s wrongful death law; traditionally that language—
”heir,” for example—ruled out recovery by cohabitants.147 In some states,
a wrongful death action may be available to cohabitants if the language of
the state statute and its interpretation by the courts define the parties
entitled to sue to include persons dependent upon the deceased person at
the time of his or her death more generally.148 For example, in Hawaii, the
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

391 U.S. 68 (1968).
391 U.S. 73 (1968).
Levy, 391 U.S. at 68.
Glona, 391 U.S. at 81-82.
Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
See Anne E. Simerman, The Right of a Cohabitant to Recover in Tort:
Wrongful, Death, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium,
32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 531, 532 (1994).
147. See, e.g., Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 184 Cal. Rptr. 390, 392 (Ct. App.
1982) (holding that California statute’s use of the term “heir” did not include a fiancé);
Harrod v. Pacific Sw. Airlines, Inc., 173 Cal. Rptr. 68, 69-70 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that exclusion of meretricious spouse from recovery as not an “heir” did not violate
equal protection).
148. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.580 (West 2011) (providing that
personal representatives may maintain action for the benefit of “a spouse or children, or
other dependents”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (West 2011) (noting that beneficiaries
of action may be “any persons who were financially dependent upon the decedent at the
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wrongful death statute provides for recovery “by any person wholly or
partly dependent upon the deceased person.”149 That state’s supreme court
has held that a decedent’s cohabitant of 16 years’ standing and her minor
child who lived with them, though not adopted by him, were the
appropriate recipients of a wrongful death award upon his death, despite
the fact that he was legally married to someone else, because they were
dependent on him and had suffered the loss of his care and affection,
protection, comfort, and financial support.150 Thus, in Hawaii, both a
decedent’s cohabitant and stepchildren are eligible to claim wrongful death
awards. This is the most generous treatment I have been able to locate. A
cohabitant’s biological but illegitimate children are protected by Levy, and
courts have interpreted that protection to extend to posthumous children as
well, even though they had never actually been dependent on the deceased
person.151 A number of states, however, which link eligibility to their
intestacy laws, still require not only proof of paternity but also
acknowledgement or adjudication prior to the father’s death in order to
recover for wrongful death.152
Many states do not allow wrongful death recovery by stepchildren, even
those of married parents.153 Again, it depends upon the language of the
state statute. If the statute limits recovery to “heirs,” an unadopted
stepchild will not qualify.154 Some states require that a stepchild establish
equitable adoption to recover in wrongful death—the doctrine that
considers a stepchild adopted if they would have been but for some legal
obstacle.155 This is not easy to do. In one Missouri case, for example, a
girl who grew up living with her mother’s husband, was close to him,
referred to him as father (he referred to her as his daughter as well), and
had always believed that he was in fact her biological father was not
allowed to recover upon his death because she was unable to prove that she
time of his or her death”); see also Simerman, supra note 146, at 533.
149. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-3 (West 2011).
150. See Lealaimatafao v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 867 P.2d 220, 224-26
(Haw. 1994).
151. See, e.g., Robinson v. Fiedler, 870 F. Supp. 193, 200-01 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
(awarding an equal share to the after-born child and his illegitimate sister, who had
been acknowledged during the decedent’s lifetime).
152. See Davis, supra note 9, at 84-86 (arguing generally that all sex-specific
illegitimacy rules should be abolished).
153. See Wardle, supra note 24, at 383; see also Robyn L. Meadows, Recovery by
Stepchildren in Wrongful Death Actions, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 777, 795-98 (1992)
(discussing the many cases denying wrongful death recovery to dependent
stepchildren).
154. See, e.g., Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 524 P.2d 801, 804-05 (Cal. 1974) (en
banc) (denying wrongful death action to stepchild under statute that at that time limited
recovery to heirs).
155. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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had been equitably adopted.156
A claim for loss of consortium, by contrast, is not statutory. Loss of
consortium is a common law tort action for damages for being deprived of
the companionship of a family member; it is derived from an old English
action to recover for the economic loss of a servant, then extended to the
loss of a spouse, and reinterpreted as one for loss of companionship.157 The
only state that has extended this claim to cohabitants is New Mexico.158 In
Lozoya v. Sanchez, Sara Lozoya had lived with Ubaldo Lozoya for at least
fifteen years in a relationship that would have qualified as a common-law
marriage if the state still recognized that status; they had three children and
all shared the same surname.159 The New Mexico Supreme Court held in
2003 that Sara could bring a claim for loss of consortium despite the fact
that they were not married, stating that:
We must consider the purpose behind the cause of action for loss of
consortium. A person brings this claim to recover for damage to a
relational interest, not a legal interest. To use the legal status as a proxy
for a significant enough relational interest is not the most precise way to
determine to whom a duty is owed. Furthermore, the use of legal status
necessarily excludes many persons whose loss of a significant relational
interest may be just as devastating as the loss of a legal spouse.160

Every other state to consider whether to extend the cause of action for
loss of consortium to unmarried partners has refused to do so.161 A
California appellate court did approve a loss of consortium claim for an
unmarried cohabitant in 1983,162 but was overruled by the California
Supreme Court in 1988 in Elden v. Sheldon on grounds of administrative
156. See Weidner v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401, 402, 403-04
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
157. See, e.g., Alisha M. Carlile, Note, Like Family: Rights of Nonmarried
Cohabitational Partners in Loss of Consortium Actions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 391, 395-96
(2005).
158. See Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 958 (N.M. 2003) (holding that New
Mexico recognized a claim for loss of consortium brought by a cohabitant).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 955 (emphasis in original).
161. See, e.g., Gurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914, 930-31 (Conn. 1991) (holding that
no cause of action existed for loss of consortium for cohabitant engaged to victim);
Medley v. Strong, 558 N.E.2d 244, 244 (Ill. 1990) (holding that cohabitant of ten years
may not recover for loss of consortium); Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 340 (Iowa
1983) (holding that there was no cause of action for loss of consortium for cohabitant
in a “stable and significant relationship” in which the couple were raising two children
of the cohabitant claiming damages); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d
1095, 1095 (Mass. 1987) (denying cause of action for loss of consortium for couple
who had lived together “as a de facto married couple” for twenty years before the
workplace accident causing injury).
162. See Butcher v. Super. Ct., 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 503 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
unmarried cohabitant may state a cause of action for loss of consortium by showing
that nonmarital relationship is both significant and stable).
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convenience, the need to protect marriage (a ground that is becoming
increasingly shaky with the progress of same-sex marriage cases), and fear
of extending liability—that is, of opening the oft-cited floodgates to
litigants.163 The New Mexico court in Lozoya, however, opined that trial
courts would be able to discern what were appropriate familial
relationships for loss of consortium claims in the absence of marriage
without a limitless extension of liability and listed a number of factors to
determine such a relationship.164 If a surviving cohabitant were able to
prove the quality of their relationship according to these factors, that
cohabitant’s child would receive the benefit of an award to his or her
remaining caretaker parent.
Despite the urging of law review
commentators,165 this is possible at present only in New Mexico.
In many states, moreover, a child, even a legitimate one, may not recover
for loss of consortium of a parent at all.166 The same California Supreme
Court that decided Elden v. Sheldon held that an action for loss of
consortium was not available to children in general, even though parents
could recover with respect to their children, so ruling in order to limit
liability (whereas the number of parent-claimants are limited by nature,
Mrs. Borer had nine children).167 When Massachusetts recognized such a
claim for children in 1980, it was one of the first states to do so;
Massachusetts limits the cause of action to children who were dependent on
the parent.168 The Supreme Judicial Court has also refused to extend the
163. 758 P.2d 582, 586-88 (Cal. 1988).
164. The factors included duration of the relationship, degree of mutual dependence,

extent of common contributions to a life together, extent and quality of shared
experience, membership in the same household, emotional reliance, and the like. See
Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 957.
165. See generally Carlile, supra note 157, at 420-21 (arguing for extension of loss
of consortium claims to cohabitants); Jonathan D. Hurley, Loss of Consortium Claims
by Unmarried Cohabitants in the Shadow of Goodridge: Has the Massachusetts SJC
Misapprehended the Relational Interest in Consortium as a Property Interest?, 39 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 163, 206 (2004) (arguing for legal protection of all stable and significant
familial relationships under the loss of consortium tort); Simerman, supra note 146, at
531 (emphasizing that, as the traditional family changes, the legal system must also
change, including by recognizing loss of consortium claims by cohabitants).
166. See Child’s Right of Action for Loss of Support, Training, Parental Attention,
or the Like, against a Third Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 11 A.L.R.4th 549 §§
4-5 (1982) (describing the many cases in which loss of consortium claims have been
denied to children and their rationales).
167. See Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 863-64 (Cal. 1977) (noting also
that loss of a parent’s company cannot be compensated monetarily and that damages
would be very difficult to measure). See generally Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth
Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy,
109 HARV. L. REV. 549, 573 (1996) (discussing the California courts’ rationale for
limiting liability, including their refusal to recognize child loss of consortium claims).
168. See Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 703 (Mass.
1980) (holding as a matter of first instance that children may sue for loss of consortium
of parent); Morgan v. Lalumiere, 493 N.E.2d 206, 211-12 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that an adult but disabled child may sue for loss of consortium of mother).
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cause of action to unadopted stepchildren.169
In short, although cohabitants and their children may qualify as
dependents in many states under their wrongful death statutes, both may be
barred from bringing an action for loss of consortium. In some
jurisdictions, the biological child of a cohabitant may be able to sue, but the
cohabitant can sue only in New Mexico and the cohabitant’s stepchild
cannot sue in any jurisdiction. Given the underlying purposes of tort
actions for wrongful death and for loss of consortium, both of these causes
of action should be available to any child living in the tort victim’s
household, whether a biological child or stepchild, without regard for the
marital status of the child’s parents.
CONCLUSION
The legal treatment of children of unmarried parents and stepchildren
must be changed if they are not to be disadvantaged in comparison with
children of married parents. With respect to the areas of law discussed in
this Article, legal reform is necessary in a variety of situations in which
legitimate children receive what is the functional equivalent of posthumous
support—that is, inheritance in the absence of a will, social security
survivors benefits, workers’ compensation, and tort suits for wrongful
death and loss of consortium. Cohabitants and stepchildren of both married
and unmarried parents should be added to the persons listed as the natural
objects of a decedent’s bounty under state intestacy law after they have
lived together for two years or the adult cohabitants have had a child in
common. The social security act should be amended so as to treat
illegitimate children genuinely as equal to legitimate children, by not
requiring proof of actual dependency at the time of the death of the insured
if they had a right to support at that time. Stepchildren of both married and
unmarried parents should also be eligible for social security benefits if they
were minors and dependent upon the insured stepparent when he or she
died. Under workers’ compensation laws, wrongful death statutes, and in
common law loss of consortium cases, awards should be available to
cohabitants’ children and stepchildren on the same terms as to children of
married parents; in most cases, this will involve dependency at the time of
death. In the absence of legal change in all these areas, children will
continue to be punished for their parents’ failure to marry.

Much of Ferriter was repealed by the Massachusetts legislature, however, when it
subjected recovery for loss of consortium in the employment context to the Worker’s
Compensation Act. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152 § 24 (2005).
169. See Mendoza v. B.L.H. Electronics, 530 N.E.2d 349, 350 (Mass. 1988)
(holding that unadopted stepchild may not recover for loss of consortium of
stepparent).
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